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I. INTRODUCTION
The statutory and constitutional status of voluntary affirma-
tive action programs in employment, particularly those using quo-
tas or numerical goals, remains open to question. The affirmative
action/reverse discrimination debate persists in employment, and
recent Supreme Court rulings on reverse discrimination challenges
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in educational admissions' and reapportionment under the Voting
Rights Act 2 have not resolved the issue whether a preference based
on race necessarily discriminates against whites so as to violate the
Constitution3 or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
The voluntary affirmative action issue raises three questions.
First, is affirmative action-something more than mere neutrality
toward race in hiring, promotions, and other employment deci-
sions-permissible under the federal laws and Constitution?' If so,
may an employer or an employer and union acting together under-
take an affirmative action program voluntarily?6 Last, may a volun-
tary affirmative action program use goals or quotas?7
Affirmative action is a significant tool for achieving the na-
tional policy of equal employment expressed in Title VII.1 Neutral-
ity toward race will not create equality if one class of applicants or
employees begins at a disadvantage created by societal stereotypes
and discrimination or by prior specific discrimination.' The Su-
1. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978).
2. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
4. 42 U.S.C. H§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1976), as amended by Equal Employment Opportun-
ity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1976)). All subsequent references to Title VII will be cited only to the United States Code.
5. See Part m infra. Affirmative action and the statutory prohibitions against discrimi-
nation also involve discrimination based on sex, religion, and national origin. Litigation over
the latter two issues has been relatively infrequent. But see Trans World Airlines v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63 (1977); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973). Sex discrimination has
been the subject of frequent litigation, but the Supreme Court has not yet ruled that sex is a
suspect classification. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Thus, at least in suits
presenting equal protection questions, the courts apply different standards to charges of sex
and race discrimination. Because differing standards introduce analytical confusion, this
Note will address race discrimination only; however, considerations similar to those discussed
here should apply to affirmative action programs imposing preferences in favor of women.
6. See Part V infra.
7. See generally N. GuzER, ArnmATIV DIscRMNATIoN: ETHNIC INEQUALrrY AND PUBLIC
Poucy (1975); REVRsE DISCRIMINATON (B. Gross ed. 1977); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an
Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L.
REV. 363, 367-88 (1966).
8. See, e.g., Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REv. 905, 952-54 (1978); Brest, Forward: In
Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31-43 (1976); Deutsch, The
Jurisprudence of Affirmative Action: A Post-Realist Analysis, 65 GEO. L.J. 879, 880 (1977);
Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cm. L. REV. 723 (1974).
9. Courts and commentators often employ racing metaphors to describe the problem.
In Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 319 F. Supp. 835 (M.D.N.C. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971), the court states:
[If two race cars are placed evenly, one beside the other, and started at the same
instant, one being allowed to accelerate to 50 m.p.h. in 7 seconds and the other in 10
seconds, with both vehicles to remain at 50 m.p.h. indefinitely, there will be an evident
distance gap between the two. Even though the constant speed limit of 50 m.p.h. affects
each car equally, it also serves to preserve and perpetuate the gap created when one, at
an earlier time, was denied an advantage allowed the other. Persuasive and controlling
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preme Court has approved affirmative action measures ordered by
lower courts to remedy prior discriminaton by an employer or
union'" and has allowed affirmative action programs established by
consent decree to stand.II Thus the Court has accepted the principle
that under certain circumstances neither the Constitution nor the
statutes require absolute neutrality toward race but instead man-
date some consideration of race in order to move toward equality.
The Court, however, has not defined the parameters of lawful af-
firmative action undertaken through voluntary programs and quo-
tas.12
The question of voluntary affirmative action is of particular
importance to the employer. Voluntary programs have a three-fold
purpose: compliance with Executive Order 11,246, which mandates
affirmative action by employers with government contracts; 3 avoid-
ance of investigation and possible suits by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Justice Department, or pri-
vate plaintiffs claiming the employer has discriminated against
minorities;" and observance of the national policy set forth in Title
VII.'5 Yet voluntary programs, entered into in an effort to obey the
authority correctly has termed such practice unlawful when applied to an individual's
employment status because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. at 840.
10. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). The lower courts have
frequently ordered affirmative action as a remedy. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638,
501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974) (union ordered to admit minorities to meet membership quota);
Erie Human Relations Comm'n v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1974) (quota hiring ordered
by court although parties had stipulated that there was no intent to discriminate); Morrow
v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974) (reversible
error for court to refuse to order quota hiring when extreme discrimination existed); Carter
v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (quota hiring
permissible to eradicate effects of past discrimination but absolute preference unlawful).
11. See EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct.
3145 (1978). In addition, a number of circuit court decisions have upheld affirmative action
programs implemented under consent decrees. Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1975)
(whites contesting quota contained in consent decree not entitled to a temporary restraining
order to halt implementation of quota); Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers Union,
514 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975) (court-approved settlement that included quota relief sustained
despite reverse discrimination challenge claiming that it would put some existing white
employees at a disadvantage compared to subsequently hired minorities).
12. See Part m infra.
13. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965). Executive Order 11,246 did not prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sex or require affirmative action to increase numbers of female employees. These
omissions were corrected by Executive Order 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 133 (1969).
14. 42 U.S.C. H§ 2000e-5, -6 (1976). See Belton, supra note 8, at 918-31; Belton, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act: A Decade of Private Enforcement and Judicial Developments, 20
ST. Louis U. L.J. 225 (1976).
15. The policy of Title VII was described by Chief Justice Burger in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971):
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of
the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers
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law and to preclude costly, time-consuming litigation or loss of con-
tracts, may expose the employer to another liability-the reverse
discrimination charge." Such charges burden not only the employer
but society as a whole. Piecemeal enforcement of Title VII and
Executive Order 11,246 by the government or by private plaintiffs
is slow and costly." Furthermore, Congress intended that compli-
ance with Title VII be voluntary rather than compelled. 8 Thus the
question whether an employer acting alone or with a union through
a collective bargaining agreement is competent to take affirmative
action to equalize the proportion of minority workers in a particular
work force with their proportion in the available labor pool requires
a clear answer.
Even if the Supreme Court were to approve voluntary affirma-
tive action in principle, the question of what form such action could
take would remain. Affirmative action may range from posting no-
tices or publishing advertisements that the employer is an "equal
opportunity employer" to active recruitment of minorities and or-
ganization of special training programs. At its farthest reach, it may
include the establishment of numerical goals or quotas for minority
employment and promotion." Although this latter element is the
aspect of affirmative action most often opposed, quotas may offer
that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the
status quo of prior discriminatory practices.
Id. at 429-30.
16. The reverse discrimination charge argues that Title VII makes racial preferences for
minorities unlawful because those preferences have the effect of discriminating against whites
on the grounds of race. See, e.g., Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976)
(court-imposed quotas altering last-hired, first-fired seniority system held to be unlawful
reverse discriminaton); Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974) (dissent).
17. The difficulties of piecemeal enforcement were shown in school desegregation in the
decade following Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430
(1968).
18. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). In Alexander the
Supreme Court read the legislative history of Title VII thus:
Congress enacted Title VII . . . to assure equality of employment opportunities by
eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. . . . Cooperation and voluntary compliance were se-
lected as the preferred means for achieving this goal. . . . In the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 . . . Congress amended Title VII to provide the Commission
with further authority to investigate individual charges of discrimination, to promote
voluntary compliance with the requirements of Title VII, and to institute civil actions
against employers or unions named in a discrimination charge.
Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
19. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10 (1978). See, e.g., Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 368 (E.D.
La. 1968), aff'd sub nom., Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d
1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (union that had excluded blacks ordered to refer blacks and whites on
one-to-one alternating quota).
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the only objective standard to measure progress toward equal em-
ployment and to insure the reality, not just the appearance, of equal
employment for minorities. 20
This Note examines the constitutional and statutory back-
ground of the affirmative action/reverse discrimination issue and
analyzes judicial decisions confronting the dilemma." The Note
then explores grounds on which the Supreme Court might permit
voluntary affirmative action using quotas.2 Existing EEOC guide-
lines and Executive'Order 11,246 offer both an objective basis on
which to develop a voluntary program and a safeguard against mis-
use of affirmative action." When the program is established in a
collective bargaining agreement, moreover, the natonal policy of
allowing free play for the bargaining process to establish terms and
conditions of employment gives an additional reason for allowing
voluntary affirmative action programs that use quotas?.2
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY BASES FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE Ac-
TIoN/REVERSE DISCRIMINATION DILEMMA
The concepts of affirmative action and reverse discrimination
are so intertwined as to make a clear delineation between them
exceedingly problematic. Both concepts develop from the constitu-
tional and statutory policy of nondiscrimination. The question of
reverse discrimination arises only when some form of affirmative
action creates a race-conscious preference in favor of a minority
group. Furthermore, the proponents of affirmative action and those
who argue that affirmative action constitutes reverse discrimination
point to the same constitutional and statutory provisons-primarily
the equal protection clause and Title VI-but read them differ-
ently.
A. The Equal Protection Clause
The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees that no state shall deny any citizen equal protection of
the laws on the grounds of race.2 When the employment decision
20. See, e.g., Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Law, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 235 (1971);
Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955 (1974).
21. See Parts II-V infra.
22. See Part VI infra.
23. See Part VI(B) infra.
24. Id.
25. The equal protection clause provides that:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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includes state action, the government and private plaintiffs have
argued that the employer's discriminaton against minorities vio-
lates the Constitution as well as the statutes." Although the Su-
preme Court initially interpreted the fourteenth amendment as pro-
tecting only blacks,27 the Court has steadily expanded the coverage
of the clause." The characterization of race as a "suspect classifica-
tion"" requiring strict scrutiny has made it possible for members of
majority as well as minority races to assert that they have been
unconstitutionally denied equal protection.
When no state action is present, plaintiffs may turn to the
thirteenth amendment and to statutes derived from it." The Su-
preme Court has recognized that statutes based on the thirteenth
amendment give a remedy for racial discrimination by private enti-
ties.31 Furthermore, the Court has ruled that this protection extends
to whites and minorities alike when disparate treatment in private
employment is based on race. 32
B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
The basic law of employment discrimination appears in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which makes it unlawful for an
employer, employment agency, or labor union to "discriminate
against any individual" in hiring, promotion, or other employment
relationships on grounds of "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."33 Some judges and scholars have read this mandate as call-
26. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), on appeal, 497 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, modified on rehearing
en banc, 452 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1972).
27. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). See McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 189-90 (1964).
28. See, e.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942); Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CAUF. L. REV. 341 (1949); Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
29. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
30. The thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, which abolished
slavery and empowered Congress to pass legislation to enforce that prohibition, made no
mention of state action. The Supreme Court has ruled that the thirteenth amendment is the
source of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and that subsequent statutes derived from that Act
reach private conduct. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
31. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (42 U.S.C. § 1982 creates right of action
against private school for racial discrimination); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421
U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 creates right of action for racial discrimination in
private employment); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (42 U.S.C. § 1982
creates cause of action against private individual for housing discrimination).
32. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 285-96 (1976).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
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ing for "colorblind" decisions and thus have concluded that it pro-
hibits any plan that creates a preference based on race except as a
make-whole remedy for identifiable victims of discrimination.34
Others, however, argue that the legislative history of the Act
demonstrates congressional concern with discrimination against
minorities and congressional intent to protect those who tradi-
tionally had been excluded from employment. 5 The latter reading
has led to development of affirmative action concepts; the former,
to charges of reverse discrimination.
A further tension in Title VII interpretation arises from an ap-
parent contradiction between section 706(g),"6 which grants the
courts broad powers to order whatever equitable relief they find
appropriate, and section 7030)," which states that no employer
shall be required to give preferential treatment based on race be-
cause of an imbalance in percentages of employees of a particular
race. Although the courts have rejected arguments that section
7030) limits them in granting quota relief,38 it is unclear whether
7030) bars voluntary affirmative relief. As a mandate, section 7030)
is directed to entities that might compel an employer to use a quota
and does not forbid an employer from choosing to remedy an imbal-
ance in numbers of minority employees.39
Title VII also created the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission," which is authorized to investigate complaints of dis-
crimination," to conciliate, to intervene in civil suits brought by
private plaintiffs4 3 and to furnish assistance when requested by
persons seeking to comply with Title VII." By emphasizing
"informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion" 5 in
Title VII, Congress clearly envisioned voluntary compliance with
the national policy of nondiscrimination as a key to the success of
the legislation.
In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.," the Su-
34. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
35. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
37. Id. § 2000e-26).
38. The courts have sustained quota relief on the grounds that § 7030) does not apply
once discrimination is found. See, e.g., Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers Union, 514
F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975); Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); Local 53,
Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(j).
40. Id. § 2000e-4.
41. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
42. Id.
43. Id. § 2000e-5(f).
44. Id. § 2000e-4(g)(3).
45. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
46. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
1979] 789
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preme Court ruled that Title VII applied to protect whites as well
as minority employees. Plaintiffs in McDonald, two white employ-
ees, were charged along with a black employee with theft from their
employer. Only the white employees were discharged. The Supreme
Court found that Title VII proscribes racial discrimination against
whites as well as against blacks." The Court, however, expressly
stated that in so ruling it was not determining the permissibility of
an affirmative action program." Rather, the Court confined itself to
a specific situation in which identically situated individuals re-
ceived disparate treatment based on race.
C. Executive Order 11,246
In an effort to broaden implementation of Title VII's policy of
equal employment, the executive branch issued Executive Order
11,246 in 1965.49 This Order required any firm with a government
contract to analyze its employment practices and to develop a plan
to bring minorities into its workforce in a percentage equal to their
presence in the available labor market. Regulations issued pursuant
to the order established a three-step procedure for affirmative action
by the contractor: (1) a study by the employer to determine areas
in which minorities are "underutilized"; (2) articulation of a plan
with specific steps to be taken to reach equal employment; and (3)
establishment of goals and timetables for equal employment. 0
The first major affirmative action plan adopted under Execu-
tive Order 11,246 was the Philadelphia Plan, which established
goals for increasing the number of minority workers in the construc-
tion trades.51 The courts considered the legality of the Philadelphia
Plan in Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secre-
tary of Labor.52 Plaintiff contractors asserted that the plan consti-
tuted social legislation enacted by the executive branch without
legislative authority and argued that the requirement of specific
numerical or percentage hiring goals violated Title VII prohibitions
against hiring or classifying employees on the basis of race.13 The
47. Id. at 278-80.
48. The Court stated: "Santa Fe disclaims that the actions challenged here were any
part of an affirmative action program, . . . and we emphasize that we do not consider here
the permissibility of such a program, whether judicially required or otherwise prompted." Id.
at 281 n.8.
49. See note 13 supra.
50. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.40, 60-2.10 (1978).
51. See Note, The Philadelphia Plan: A Study in the Dynamics of Executive Power,
39 U. CHI. L. REv. 723 (1972).
52. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
53. The court analyzed the order in terms of the categories of executive actions deline-
ated in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952): (1) executive actions
undertaken pursuant to implied or express congressional authorization; (2) executive actions
790 [Vol. 32:783
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court rejected plaintiffs' position, stating that such an interpreta-
tion of the statute would serve only to perpetuate the status quo and
to preclude any remedies for discrimination." The court further
ruled that nothing in Title VII prevented the executive branch from
conditioning its contracts on the use of goals to remedy the lack of
minority workers in the construction trades.55
III. JUDICIAILY IMPOSED AND CONSENT DECREE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANS
A. Affirmative Action as a Court-Ordered Remedy
Section 706(g) of Title VII empowers the courts to order hiring,
reinstatement, back pay, or "any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate"" to correct unlawful employment practices.
The Supreme Court has approved the use of racial preferences as
part of a make-whole remedy imposed by courts after finding prior
discrimination by the employer. In Franks v. Bowman Transporta-
tion Co.57 the Court approved the award of "constructive" seniority
to minorities and rejected the argument that the constructive sen-
iority had an impermissible effect on the existing seniority of white
employees. In Franks the lower courts had found that Bowman
Transportation had discriminated by refusing to hire blacks who
applied for jobs as over-the-road truck drivers." The lower courts,
however, had denied seniority relief to nonemployees who had ap-
plied and been rejected for employment, limiting relief to enjoining
the employer from continuing the discriminatory practices and re-
quiring notification to the minority nonemployees that they would
be given priority in future hiring." The Supreme Court granted
certiorari on the issue of retroactive seniority awards" and ruled
undertaken without either a legislative grant or denial of the authority to act; and (3) execu-
tive actions that contradict the express or implied legislative will. 442 F.2d at 167-72. See 42
U.S.C. H§ 2000e-2(a), (h), (j) (1976).
54. The court stated that to read the statute as plaintiffs did would "attribute to
Congress the intention to freeze the status quo and to foreclose remedial action under other
authority designed to overcome existing evils. We discern no such intention from the language
of the statute or from its legislative history." 442 F.2d at 173. The court cited Porcelli v. Titus,
302 F. Supp. 726 (D.N.J. 1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970); Norwalk CORE v.
Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968); and Offerman v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d
22 (2d Cir. 1967), as having approved color consciousness as a remedial measure.
55. 442 F.2d at 173. Subsequent cases upholding similar affirmative action plans in-
clude Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1974); Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie,
471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972); Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1970); and Weiner
v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
57. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
58. Id. at 751-52.
59. Id. at 752.
60. Id.
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that an award of constructive or "fictional" seniority would be pro-
per as the only means of achieving the make-whole purpose of Title
V]l.61
Defendants in Franks argued that the award of retroactive sen-
iority would injure the economic interests of existing white employ-
ees by diminishing the value of their accrued seniority.6 2 The Court
pointed out that seniority is not an indefeasibly vested right and
may be modified by statute and by collective bargaining agreements
when strong public policy reasons justify modification. 3 Further-
more, the Court stated that denial of constructive seniority "on the
sole ground that such relief diminishes the expectations of other,
arguably innocent, employees would if applied generally frustrate
the central 'make-whole' objective of Title VII."" Thus possible
injury to white employees did not bar a grant of constructive senior-
ity if the employer had discriminated against minorities. The Sec-
ond Circuit in Acha v. Beame,'" a suit alleging that the New York
Police Department had discriminated against women, allowed con-
structive seniority not only to those women who had applied and
been rejected but also to those who could show that they would have
applied but were deterred by the knowledge of the employer's dis-
crimination.
Although lower courts have ruled that preferential quotas do
not constitute reverse discrimination when they are necessary to
eradicate the effects of past discriminatory practices, the Second
Circuit has shown recurrent concern with limiting quota relief. In
Kirkland v. New York State Department of Correctional Services,"
the Second Circuit indicated that court-imposed quotas were proper
only if plaintiffs demonstrated a clear-cut pattern of long-standing
and egregious racial discrimination by the employer and produced
evidence that the quota would not affect an identifiable group of
nonminority persons. The Kirkland court also examined the dura-
tion of the quota relief ordered by the lower court, which had set no
time limit on the promotional quota." Finding insufficient proof of
prior discriminaton, the Second Circuit held that imposing
"permanent quotas to eradicate the effects of past discriminatory
practices" was unwarranted. 8 The Second Circuit again applied the
61. Id. at 767-68.
62. Id. at 773.
63. Id. at 778-79.
64. Id. at 774.
65. 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976).
66. 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975).
67. Id. at 428.
68. Id.
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Kirkland standard in EEOC v. Local 638," a suit against a union
that had barred minorities from membership. In Local 638 the lower
court had ordered both the use of a goal to increase minority mem-
bership and the removal of one member of the union's governing
committee with the position to be filled by a minority union mem-
ber.70 The Second Circuit invalidated the latter portion of the order
but affirmed the use of a goal for increased minority membership
because "entry-level goals have less identifiable impact upon re-
verse discriminatees and are therefore less objectionable as tempo-
rary remedies." 7 The Second Circuit thus has limited court-
imposed quota relief to temporary programs that remedy egregious
discrimination without an impact on identifiable white individuals.
The Supreme Court, however, has not addressed the validity of
these restrictions on court-ordered quota relief.
B. Consent Decree Affirmative Action Programs and Quotas
The Supreme Court has allowed to stand affirmative action
programs imposed by consent decrees. Under a consent decree the
employer does not concede that he has discriminated in the past,
nor does the court make a finding of discrimination. Thus a consent
decree involves no proof of prior discrimination as a prerequisite for
affirmative action. The Court recently denied review of lower court
refusals to modify a consent decree entered into by American Tele-
phone & Telegraph 72 that provided for goals, targets and "affir-
mative action override" for promotions to improve the status of
minority and female employees.73 The lower court had held that
section 706(g) of Title VII did not proscribe relief to classes con-
taining nonidentifiable victims of specific discrimination.
In Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. IBEW Local Unions,75
a suit to resolve a conflict between an affirmative action program
entered into by a consent decree and the seniority provisions of a
69. 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976).
70. Id. at 829.
71. Id. at 830. See also Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976); Acha
v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976); Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers Union, 514
F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482
F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), on appeal, 497 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991
(1975).
72. EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.,
Communications Workers v. EEOC, 98 S.Ct. 3145 (1978). The consent decree is reproduced
at 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 431:73. See also 8 LAs. REL. REP. (BNA) 431:125 (steel industry
consent decree); 8 LAB. Rt. REP. (BNA) 431:53 (General Electric conciliation agreement).
The steel industry consent decree received court approval in United States v. Allegheny-
Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1975).
73. See Communications Workers v. EEOC, 98 S.Ct. 3145 (1978).
74. Communications Workers v. EEOC, 556 F.2d at 175.
75. 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976).
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collective bargaining agreement, the employer sought a declaratory
judgment as to whether the consent decree or the collective bargain-
ing agreement governed layoffs. The collective bargaining agree-
ment provided for layoffs on a last-hired, first-fired basis.76 Al-
though all parties conceded that the layoff provision would have a
disproportionate effect on minorities hired under the affirmative
action plan,n the Third Circuit held that the seniority clause pro-
viding for layoffs in reverse order of seniority was permissible.7 8 The
Supreme Court, however, remanded Jersey Central for considera-
tion in light of its holding in Franks.79 This decision indicates that
the Franks principle of constructive seniority is applicable to con-
sent decrees as well as to judicially constructed affirmative action
remedies. Under Franks existing seniority could be modified to
place minorities in the seniority status that they would have had,
absent the employer's prior discrimination. Thus, if given con-
structive seniority, minorities hired to meet consent decree goals
and timetables would no longer be in the "first-fired" position in
the event of layoffs.
In sum, the Supreme Court has rejected reverse discrimination
attacks on affirmative action when the plans using racial prefer-
ences were judicially created or approved in consent decrees. When
there had been prior discrimination, whether found by the court or
tacitly conceded by the employer under a consent decree, the effect
of the programs on white employees was not unlawful.
IV. SUPREME COURT CONSIDERATION OF REVERSE
DISCRIMINATION IN NONEMPLOYMENT CONTEXTS
A. Reapportionment Under the Voting Rights Act
In United Jewish Organizations v. Careyo members of a Has-
idic Jewish community challenged a state redistricting plan insti-
tuted under the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The redistricting plan
increased the voting strength of blacks and Puerto Ricans but de-
creased that of the Jewish group, which had constituted a majority
in its former district but was now split between two districts having
nonwhite majorities."1 The Jewish group argued that the redistrict-
ing plan was unlawful because it diluted their voting power solely
to achieve a racial quota and assigned voters to electoral districts
76. Id. at 691.
77. Id. The affirmative action plan had established certain goals and timetables for
implementation.
78. Id. at 710.
79. 425 U.S. 987 (1976).
80. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
81. Id. at 149-52.
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on a racial basis.82 The Supreme Court rejected their reverse dis-
crimination argument, holding that a state could adopt a redistrict-
ing plan upon a ruling by the Attorney General or a court that the
plan did not have a racially discriminatory purpose." Furthermore,
the Court stated that the use of racial considerations in drawing
district lines in complying with the Voting Rights Act is not uncon-
stitutional" and may be appropriate for purposes other than elimi-
nating past discriminatory apportionment. The Court further held
that mere use of numerical quotas in redistricting did not violate the
equal protection clause and that New York's redistricting plan did
no more than was proper under the nonretrogression principle ap-
proved by the Court in earlier rulings."
Of particular importance was the Court's recognition of the
congressional intent behind the Voting Rights Act. The majority
opinion noted that Congress had relied on the United States Com-.
mission on Civil Rights' findings that community redistricting plans
endangered the voting strength of minorities by dividing them
among predominantly white voting districts. 7 The Court noted
prior cases, Beer v. United States" and City of Richmond v. United
States," in which it had established the principle that redistricting
was not proper when it reduced or "would lead to a retrogression"
in the voting strength of racial minorities. 0 The Carey Court rea-
'soned that implicit in these decisions was the proposition that the
fourteenth amendment did not bar a state from creating or preserv-
ing black majorities in particular districts." Furthermore, the Court
refused to confine the use of racial criteria for redistricting to the
elimination of past discriminatory apportionment. 2 It should be
noted that redistricting under the Voting Act is undertaken by the
state, not by a private entity, and must be approved by either the
attorney general or a court, differing in that respect from affirmative
action voluntarily undertaken by an employer. Nonetheless, the
Court's recognition that congressional findings may provide a basis
82. Id. at 152-53.
83. Id. at 157.
84. Id. at 160.
85. Id. at 161.
86. Id. at 165. See text accompanying notes 88-90 infra.
87. 430 U.S. at 158.
88. 425 U.S. 130 (1976). In the words of the Court: "Beer established that the Voting
Rights Act does not permit the implementation of a reapportionment that 'would lead to a
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise.'" 430 U.S. at 159.
89. 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
90. 430 U.S. at 159-61.
91. Id. at 161.
92. Id. The Court stated: "The permissible use of racial criteria is not confined to
eliminating the effects of past discriminatory districting or apportionment." Id.
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for affirmative action on behalf of minorities and that the use of
racial criteria is not confined to remedying past discrimination is
relevant in the employment context as well.
B. Affirmative Action in Educational Admissions:
The Bakke Ruling
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke" presented the
Court with a reverse discrimination challenge to an affirmative ac-
tion program instituted voluntarily by a university in an effort to
comply with the national policy of increased minority enrollment
and with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Allan Bakke, a
white applicant to the university's medical school, had been denied
admission twice." In both years, under its special admissions pro-
gram for the "economically and/or educationally disadvantaged,"
the school admitted individuals with lower scores on the Medical
College Admission Test, lower admissions "benchmark" ratings,
and lower grade point averages than those of Bakke." Bakke
brought suit alleging violations of the equal protection clause and
Title VI." The California Supreme Court ordered Bakke's admis-
sion to the medical school and enjoined the university from consid-
ering race in subsequent admissions decisions. 7
The United States Supreme Court affirmed that part of the
California court's decision ordering Bakke's admission and finding
the admissions program at issue unlawful, but ruled that the school
could consider race in admissions under certain circumstances."
The Court was fragmented in its decision: four members-Chief
Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Ste-
vens-argued for full affirmation of the California ruling," and
four-Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun-asserted
that the lower court decision should be reversed in its entirety.1"
The pivotal vote was cast by Justice Powell, who held that Bakke
should be admitted and that the program at issue was unlawful but
that race could be considered as a factor in achieving diversity in a
student body.1os
93. 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978).
94. Id. at 2741.
95. Id. at 2741-42. White students could and did apply to the special admissions pro-
gram. Id. at 2742 n.5.
96. Id. at 2742.
97. Id. at 2743-44.
98. Id. at 2739.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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(1) The Powell Opinion
Writing for the Court, Justice Powell applied equal protection
analysis to the Title VI issue.10 2 He began by questioning whether
Title VI imposed a "color-blind" standard.10 3 After examining the
legislative history Justice Powell concluded that Congress had not
considered the possibility that preferences for minority citizens
might arise in the future, but rather had focused on the elimination
of existing discrimination against minorities by institutions receiv-
ing federal funds."' Justice Powell further interpreted the legislative
history as indicating that Congress intended Title VI to incorporate
the constitutional equal protection standard and therefore con-
cluded that Title VI proscribed "only those racial classifications
that would violate the Equal Protection Clause."105
Having reached this conclusion, Justice Powell next considered
the appropriate degree of judicial scrutiny. He rejected the argu-
ment that the Court should not apply strict scrutiny because
Bakke, a white male, was not a member of a "discrete and insular
minority": discreteness and insularity were not prerequisites to
finding a classification invidious.'" Any classification based on race,
Justice Powell stated, is inherently suspect and subject to strict
scrutiny.10 Justice Powell further rejected the legitimacy of
heightened judicial protection for minority groups under the equal
protection clause. 0 On this point, Justice Powell disagreed with the
four Justices who would have reversed the lower court ruling in its
entirety. As Justice Powell read their opinions, those Justices would
require only that the group receiving preferential treatment had
been the victim of past societal discrimination and that it be reason-
able to believe that the disparate impact of the program was the
ultimate result of that societal discrimination."' Justice Powell
found this theory excessively broad and speculative because it could
be applied to numerous ethnic and racial groups and required spec-
102. Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), provides that no person shall be excluded on
grounds of race from any program receiving federal funds. Justice Powell did not specify
whether he was treating the issue of Bakke's exclusion from the school as a constitutional
issue or using the equal protection analysis as a guide to the proper interpretation of the
statute in question. Thus whether the decision is constitutional or statutory remains unclear.
103. 98 S.Ct. at 2745. Justice Powell also considered whether Title VI created a private
right of action and assumed, for the purpose of this suit only, that it did. Id. at 2744-45.
104. Id. at 2746. Justice Powell stated: "There simply was no reason for Congress to
consider the validity of hypothetical preferences that might be accorded minority citizens;
the legislators were dealing with the real and pressing problem of how to guarantee those
citizens equal treatment." Id.
105. Id. at 2747.
106. Id. at 2748.
107. Id. at 2749.
108. Id. at 2748-52.
109. Id. at 2751 n.36.
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ulation as to a causal link between general discrimination and a
specific program.no Such an approach would compel the Court to
make political and sociological determinations as to the extent of
societal discrimination toward a given minority group, the degree of
harm to the group, and the point at which the prejudice and harm
exceed a tolerable level."' The only principled basis on which to
apply the equal protection clause, Justice Powell asserted, was to
guarantee to every individual, whatever his race, the same degree
of judicial scrutiny of a racial classification which impinges on his
personal rights- "a judicial determination that the burden he is
asked to bear . . . is precisely tailored to serve a compelling govern-
mental interest.'-'112
Justice Powell next rejected the applicability of school desegre-
gation, employment discrimination, and sex discrimination cases in
which, the university argued, the Court had applied a lesser degree
of scrutiny. According to Justice Powell, racial classifications in the
school cases were allowed in order to remedy constitutional viola-
tions determined by the courts. 13 Similarly, the employment deci-
sions rested on findings by the courts, legislature, or administrative
agencies that the employer or industry had discriminated against
minorities." The sex discrimination cases were not analogous be-
cause the Court had never found sex to be a suspect classification
and because, in Justice Powell's view, gender-based classifications
created more manageable issues than race-based preferences."s
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2751-52. In Justice Powell's words:
There is no principled basis for deciding which groups would merit "heightened judicial
solicitude" and which would not. Courts would be asked to evaluate the extent of the
prejudice and consequent harm suffered by various minority groups. Those whose socie-
tal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary level of tolerability then would be entitled
to preferential classifications at the expenses of individuals belonging to other groups.
Those classifications would be free from exacting judicial scrutiny. As these preferences
began to have their desired effect, and the consequences of past discrimination were
undone, new judicial rankings would be necessary. The kind of variable sociological and
political analysis necessary to produce such rankings simply does not lie within the
judicial competence-even if they otherwise were politically feasible and socially desira-
ble.
Id.
112. Id. at 2753.
113. Id. at 2754.
114. Id. at 2754-55. The employment cases cited were Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,
424 U.S. 747 (1975); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Associated Gen.
Contractors, Inc. v. Altschuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974);
Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973),
on appeal, 497 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Carter v. Gallagher,
452 F.2d 315, modified on rehearing en banc, 452 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1972); Contractors Ass'n
v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d.Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
115. 98 S.Ct. at 2755. Justice Powell found gender-based classifications "less likely to
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Justice Powell also addressed the university's argument that
recent decisions under Title VI and the Voting Rights Act expressed
judicial approval of preferences granted to minorities without appli-
cation of strict scrutiny."' Justice Powell noted three elements in
those decisions that were absent from Bakke: an administrative
finding of discrimination, a total foreclosure of minorities from a
right, and nonexistent or innocuous effects of the remedy on the
majority race."7 In Bakke no governmental branch had found that
the university had discriminated, minority students were not fore-
closed totally from medical school, and the program excluded some
applicants from sixteen places in the class." 8
Although Justice Powell stressed findings of specific prior dis-
crimination as prerequisites for permissible affirmative action, he
suggested in a footnote the possibility that a more general finding
might be sufficient. He recognized "the special competence of Con-
gress to make findings with respect to the effects of identified past
discrimination and its discretionary authority to take appropriate
measures.""' Thus Justice Powell might have read Title VI as em-
bodying a congressional finding of past discrimination and a con-
gressional mandate for correction of the effects of discrimination. 0
This reading might have enabled Justice Powell to rule in favor of
the university's voluntary affirmative action program; given an ap-
propriate determination of prior discrimination, the school and
employment cases distinguished by Justice Powell would have justi-
fied not applying strict scrutiny.
Justice Powell, however, was unable to accept the university's
voluntary implementation of a program to increase minority stu-
dent enrollment without an accusation or finding of past racial dis-
crimination, despite the presence of statistics showing that minority
admissions were almost nonexistent prior to the affirmative action
program.121 Justice Powell argued that an individual state institu-
tion lacked competence to make a finding of discrimination and to
establish a remedial program: "isolated segments of our vast gov-
create . . . analytical and practical problems" than racial preferences because "[wlith
respect to gender there are only two possible classifications." Id.
116. Id. The cases cited were Lau v. Nicholas, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), which had required
that the San Francisco school system provide special remedial English instruction for stu-
dents of Oriental extraction, and United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977),
in which the Court approved a voting reapportionment plan that used racial considerations.
117. 98 S.Ct. at 2755-56.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2755 n.41.
120. Justice Powell himself appeared to recognize that Congress had made a finding of
societal discrimination and passed legislation to remedy it. See id. at 2745-47.
121. Id. at 2739.
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ernmental structures are not competent to make those decisions, at
least in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively deter-
mined criteria."1 2 2
Thus Justice Powell concluded that in the absence of a legisla-
tive, executive, or judicial finding of prior discrimination, a state
program established under Title VI that employs a racial classifica-
tion is subject to strict scrutiny.2 *In applying strict scrutiny, Jus-
tice Powell examined four "compelling state interests" advanced by
the university. First, he stated that the need to attain a specific
percentage of minority students in the student body was not a sub-
stantial interest and was invalid as discrimination for its own
sake.124 Second, although recognizing a substantial state interest in
ameliorating the effects of discrimination, Justice Powell held that
interest inapplicable because specific prior discrimination had not
been established.'" Third, Justice Powell found that the state inter-
est in improvement of health care services to underserved communi-
ties was insufficient to meet strict scrutiny because the university
did not show that their affirmative action program would bring
about any improvement."2
Last, however, Justice Powell agreed that diversity of a student
body was a compelling state interest sufficient to justify racial clas-
sification in admissions programs.'" Justice Powell viewed the uni-
versity's freedom to choose a diverse student body as an aspect of
academic freedom, protected under the first amendment. 128 The
program at issue in Bakke, however, failed the second part of the
strict scrutiny test: the method of attaining the compelling state
interest of diversity was not the least restrictive alternative for
reaching that goal.129 Justice Powell cited the Harvard admissions
program as an example of permissible use of race in admissions. 3 o
The Harvard program treats race as a "plus" factor, but uses it as
only one of several factors in admissions decisions. 3' Thus Justice
Powell concluded that an educational institution may consider the
122. Id. at 2758-59.
123. It remains unclear whether the program was subject to strict scrutiny because it
allegedly violated the equal protection clause or because it allegedly violated Title VI, which
Justice Powell read as proscribing "only those racial classifications that would violate the
Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 2747.
124. Id. at 2757.
125. Id. at 2757-59.
126. Id. at 2759-60.
127. "[Alttainment of a diverse student body . . . clearly is a constitutionally permis-
sible goal for an institution of higher education." Id. at 2760.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2761-64.
130. Id. at 2762-64.
131. Id. at 2762.
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race of its applicants and may seek deliberately a racially diverse
student body through a "properly devised admissions program." 32
(2) The Pro-Affirmative Action Opinions
Four of the Justices addressing Bakke's reverse discrimination
challenge would have found the university's affirmative action pro-
gram statutorily and constitutionally permissible.'* Justice Bren-
nan found voluntary affirmative action under Title VI a proper
remedy for the effects of societal discrimination.' The legislative
history of Title VI, according to Justice Brennan, showed that Con-
gress intended to give the executive branch the power to end federal
funding of programs that discriminated against minorities.'" Con-
gress further intended that compliance should be voluntary and
could include "race-conscious remedies."'3 Justice Brennan con-
cluded that institutions subject to Title VI should be given
"considerable latitude" in their voluntary efforts to prevent the
exclusion of minorities.'
Justice Brennan then turned from Title VI to the equal protec-
tion issue. Neither strict scrutiny nor the rational basis test was
appropriate: Justice Brennan considered that the university's pur-
pose to remedy the effects of past societal discrimination to be suffi-
cient justification "where there is a sound basis for concluding that
minority underrepresentation is substantial and chronic, and that
the handicap of past discrimination is impeding access of minorities
to the medical school."' 3' Justice Brennan reasoned that when Con-
gress has authorized race-conscious relief, findings of specific prior
discrimination are not necessary so long as the beneficiaries of the
affirmative action are within a class of persons who have suffered
discrimination in society at large.'"3 Although questioning the exist-
ence of a private right of action under Title VI,"" Justice White
concurred with Justice Brennan and with those portions of Justice
Powell's opinion that recognized the right of a university admissions
program to use race as a factor.'4 '
After tracing the history of discrimination against minorities,
132. Id. at 2764.
133. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun would have reversed the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court ruling in its entirety. Id. at 2767.
134. Id. at 2768.
135. Id. at 2768-74.
136. Id. at 2772.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2789.
139. Id. at 2791.
140. Id. at 2794-98.
141. Id. at 2798 n.7.
1979]1 801
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Justice Marshall rejected the use of the equal protection clause as
a barrier to affirmative action. 14 2 He concluded that individuals re-
ceiving preferential treatment under affirmative action need not
have been specific victims of direct discrimination; being members
of a minority group that had suffered pervasive, long-term discrimi-
nation was enough.4 3
Justice Blackmun argued that, even given Justice Powell's the-
sis that the fourteenth amendment "embraces a 'broader princi-
ple' " than its original theory of protection for blacks, the amend-
ment did not prohibit the affirmative action program at issue.'" For
Justice Blackmun, the broadening of the fourteenth amendment did
not alter its original purpose of preventing discrimination against
blacks, a purpose promoted by affirmative action.'
Thus four Justices rejected both the reverse discrimination
challenge to voluntary affirmative action and the use of the equal
protection clause and strict scrutiny to block voluntary race-
conscious remedies aimed at alleviating the continuing effects of
recognized societal discrimination. The effect of affirmative action
on whites was neither a denial of equal protection nor a violation of
Title VI's prohibition of discrimination based on race.
(3) The Anti-Affirmative Action Position
The four Justices who opposed the affirmative action program
gave the controversy and the statute a narrow reading, never reach-
ing the equal protection question.'" Justice Stevens, who wrote the
opinion of this faction of the Court, defined the controversy as one
between an individual and a school that had denied him admission
and thus found no need to evaluate the permissibility of racial clas-
sifications or preferences in general."' For Justice Stevens, the
statement in section 601 of Title VI that no person shall be discrimi-
nated against on the ground of race was an absolute bar to excluding
142. Id. at 2798-2803.
143. Id. at 2804-06.
144. Id. at 2807.
145. Id. In Justice Blackmun's words:
This enlargement does not mean for me, however, that the Fourteenth Amendment
has broken away from its moorings and its original intended purposes. Those original
aims persist. And that, in a distinct sense, is what "affirmative action," in the face of
proper facts, is all about. If this conflicts with idealistic equality, that tension is original
Fourteenth Amendment tension, constitutionally conceived and constitutionally im-
posed, and it is part of the Amendment's very nature until complete equality is achieved
in the area.
Id.
146. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist would have af-
firmed the California Supreme Court opinion in its entirety. Id. at 2815.
147. Id. at 2810.
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anyone on racial grounds from a program receiving federal funds.'"
Justice Stevens concluded that Bakke had been excluded from med-
ical school because he was white and thus that the school had vio-
lated Title VI."' It should be noted, however, that the university did
not bar Bakke from applying to both the regular and special admis-
sions programs. In fact, a number of whites did apply to both.,"0
Given Bakke's scores in relation to those of disadvantaged appli-
cants admitted, Bakke would have had a significantly better chance
of being admitted had he been both black and economically or
educationally disadvantaged. The university program, however,
would have provided no special advantage for Bakke had he been
black but from a middle-class background. Thus, Justice Stevens'
conclusion that Bakke's exclusion was based solely on race is not
entirely justified.
(4) Analytical Difficulties in the Bakke Holding
The ruling in Bakke offered support to both advocates and
opponents of affirmative action. The decision reasserted the pro-
priety of affirmative action and quota relief when based on a finding
that the entity instituting the program had discriminated in the
past. It also approved the voluntary use of race-conscious criteria in
educational admissions. At the same time, the decision prohibited
the specific voluntary affirmative action program at issue and its
use of quotas.
The emphasis on a finding of prior discrimination as a prere-
quisite to affirmative action with quota relief raises two related
questions: first, who is competent to make such a finding; and sec-
ond, could either party to a reverse discriminaton suit reasonably
be expected to prove prior discrimination?
Justice Powell did not insist that the finding of prior discrimi-
nation be made only by a court, recognizing that legislative and
administrative findings had been sufficient in employment and
school discrimination cases. 51 In the context of educational admis-
sions, however, he refused to recognize Title VI and the Civil Rights
Act as embodying a legislative mandate and as delegating to the
EEOC the power to make rules and guidelines for affirmative ac-
tion.
The validity of requiring a finding of prior discrimination in
order to reject a reverse discrimination challenge must be evaluated
in terms of whether either party to the suit will introduce such
148. Id. at 2811.
149. Id. at 2815.
150. Id. at 2740 n.5.
151. See notes 119-20 supra and accompanying text.
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evidence.15 In a Bakke-type suit, neither party has reason to try to
establish past discrimination against minorities. The plaintiff
clearly would avoid proof of prior discrimination that might justify
the challenged affirmative action program and thereby defeat his
reverse discrimination claim. The defendant, on the other hand,
could not assert his prior discrimination as a defense because such
an admission would expose him to suits by minorities and the gov-
ernment. Thus the key element that Justice Powell requires for
quota-type affirmative action will be absent almost inevitably from
reverse discrimination litigation.
A further issue needing examination is Justice Powell's treat-
ment of Title VI and the equal protection clause as coextensive and
coterminous. 53 In Justice Powell's analysis the statutory issue was
imperceptibly transformed into the constitutional issue, and any
logical distinction between statutory and constitutional grounds for
the ruling became blurred. The test for a Title VI violation thus
became identical to that for an equal protection violation. Whether
the equal protection clause strict scrutiny test is appropriate in
evaluating alleged violations of other portions of the Civil Rights
Act remains an open question.
V. VOLUNTARY AFFmMATIvE AcTION IN EMPLOYMENT:
Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.
The Fifth Circuit recently analyzed the validity of racial prefer-
ences in an affirmative action program established by collective
bargaining agreement in Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corporation.'" Kaiser Aluminum and the United Steelworkers of
America had agreed in their collective bargaining agreement to take
minority employees into on-the-job training programs on a one-to-
one ratio with whites in order to increase the number of minority
members of craft families.' 5 Individual Kaiser plants were to use
the program until the proportion of minority craft workers at the
plant was roughly equal to the percentage of minorities in the rele-
vant available work force.' Separate seniority lists-one for whites,
one for blacks-were established solely for this program.' Brian
Weber, a white employee at Kaiser's Gramercy, Louisiana, plant
152. See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 231 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Wisdom, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3401-02 (December 12, 1978).
153. See notes 102-12 supra and accompanying text.
154. 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977).
155. Id. at 218. The agreement became effective in February 1974.
156. Id.
157. Id. All other seniority benefits were conferred on the basis of a single seniority list.
The two lists were used only to determine eligibility for the special on-the-job training pro-
gram. Id. at 218 n.1.
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brought a class action suit under Title VII charging that blacks with
less seniority had obtained positions in the training program.", The
district court found that the program constituted unlawful reverse
discrimination and enjoined the use of the quota at the Gramercy
plant.'"' On appeal the Fifth Circuit affirmed.5"'
The Fifth Circuit defined the problem as properly distinguish-
ing between permissible affirmative action and unlawful reverse
discrimination."' The court examined the question solely in statu-
tory terms; because the employer and union were private entities,
the constitutional equal protection issue was not raised, obviating
any need to look to equal protection analysis as a guide to statutory
analysis. The Fifth Circuit read Title VII as permitting racial prefer-
ence only as a make-whole remedy for victims of the employer's
prior discrimination.' According to the Weber court, the remedial
element was the common factor in previously approved affirmative
action and quota plans.' 3 The Weber court therefore concluded that
"[q]uotas imposed to achieve the 'make whole' objective of Title
VII rest on a presumption of some prior discrimination."' The
court, however, rejected the lower court's holding that only the judi-
ciary could impose a quota. Noting Title VII's emphasis on volun-
tary compliance, the Fifth Circuit cited federal court approval of
consent decrees that included quotas."'
The Kaiser affirmative action plan was neither court-imposed
nor developed as part of a consent decree after an administrative
investigation. The employer and union instituted the plan in an
effort to comply with Executive Order 11,246, a purpose which the
Fifth Circuit found inadequate to justify the use of racial prefer-
ences detrimental to white workers in the absence of proof of prior
discrimination by the employer.' The court relegated to a footnote
the argument that, because traditional craft union discrimination
had prevented minority workers from gaining the experience re-
quired for on-the-job training before 1974, the affirmative action
158. Id. at 218.
159. 415 F. Supp. 761, 770 (E.D. La. 1976).
160. 563 F.2d at 227.
161. Id. at 219. The court posed the question thus: "When does preferential treatment
become illegal reverse discrimination?" Id. The phrasing of the question presupposed that
reverse discrimination creates a valid cause of action.
162. Id. at 226.
163. Id. at 219-21.
164. Id. at 221.
165. Id. at 223-24. The district court had distinguished between the power of a court to
establish affirmative action remedies and the right of other entities to do so, stating that great
caution must be used in imposing quota systems and "only the judiciary should be entrusted
with fashioning and administering such relief." Id. at 223 (emphasis in original).
166. Id. at 226-27.
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plan was necessary to ameliorate the present effects of past union
discrimination."' Furthermore, the court confined its inquiry to the
Gramercy plant alone: in the period from 1964 to 1974, twenty-six
white employees and two black employees attained craft positions
through Kaiser's pre-affirmative action training program."8 The
court found this sampling too small to establish that the craft-
experience requirement discriminated against blacks, particularly
in the light of evidence that Kaiser actively recruited black employ-
ees in the 1964-1974 period."' While conceding that the lack of black
craft workers may have been due to societal discrimination, the
court required that responsibility for discrimination be assigned di-
rectly to the employer in order to justify affirmative action.o7 0 The
court disregarded any question of prior discrimination by the union,
also a party to the suit and to the collective bargaining agreement,
as a justification for the program."'
According to the Fifth Circuit, Title VII forbids preferences for
either minority or majority groups based on race but allows
"preferences favoring victims of discrimination." 7 2 The court dis-
tinguished a preference in favor of an entire group from one granted
to a specific individual, reasoning that the latter is justified not
because the victim of discrimination was a member of a minority
race, but because he was a victim. 7 3 When the preference compen-
sates a victim, its harmful effect on another employee does not
invalidate it."' Furthermore, the court reasoned that if race was the
basis of the initial arbitrary deprivation, race may also be the arbi-
trary factor by which the formerly favored employees are deprived
of advantages unfairly gained. 75
The conclusion that quotas are permissible as remedies for spe-
cific individual injuries led the court to reject societal discrimina-
tion as a sufficient basis for racial preferences. The court stated that
Title VII strictly forbids preferences based on race except "to restore
employees to their rightful places within a particular employment
scheme."' 7 In the Fifth Circuit's view, those minority workers ad-
mitted to the training program with less seniority than whites also
seeking admission had not been displaced previously from their
167. Id. at 224 n.13.
168. Id. at 224-26.
169. Id. at 226.
170. Id. at 225-26.
171. Id. at 224 n.13.
172. Id. at 224.
173. Id. at 224-25.
174. Id. at 225.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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rightful places within this specific employment scheme and there-
fore had no right to be advanced past their white competitors: 7
"Whatever other effects societal discrimination may have, it has
had . . . no effect on the seniority of any party here."' 78 For that
reason, the court found the affirmative action plan unlawful as it
affected seniority at the Gramercy plant.7
Thus the Fifth Circuit resolved the affirmative action/reverse
discrimination question by construing Title VII as a broad prohibi-
tion of any racial preference, whether granted to majority or minor-
ity races. Only a finding of identifiable discrimination against spe-
cific victims can justify what otherwise would be an unlawful prefer-
ence: the finding of specific prior discrimination transforms an ille-
gal preference into a permissible make-whole remedy. Societal dis-
crimination, according to the Weber court, is not sufficiently related
to the specific employment situation to work this transformation.
The final point considered by the court was the contention that
Executive Order 11,246 made the plan legal even if Title VII did not
sanction it."' The Fifth Circuit found the mandate for affirmative
action in Executive Order 11,246 to be in direct conflict with their
reading of Title VII as barring racial preferences. Previous cases
approving the executive order had not conflicted with the statute
because there had been findings in each case of prior discrimina-
tion.' In the absence of such a finding in Weber, compliance with
Executive Order 11,246 provided no defense to a reverse discrimina-
tion challenge;'12 the executive order must give way to the statute
when the two conflict.'" The Fifth Circuit therefore ruled against
the affirmative action plan as it operated in Kaiser's Gramercy
plant.
In a strong dissent, Judge Wisdom argued for approval of rea-
sonable voluntary affirmative action.'8 1 Judge Wisdom first con-
tended that both the employer and the union were under pressure
from the government to take affirmative action and that both feared
private suits based on past exclusion of blacks when they negotiated
the agreement that included the plan at issue. 85 Furthermore, the
plan was modelled on a consent decree plan in the steel industry
approved by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Allegheny-
177. Id.
178. Id. at 226 (emphasis in original).
179. Id. at 225-26.
180. Id. at 226.
181. Id. at 226-27.
182. Id. at 227.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 228-29.
185. Id.
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Ludlum Industries.5 8 Judge Wisdom next argued that the major-
ity's standard for evaluating the voluntary affirmative action
plan-whether a court would have found prior discrimination and
imposed a remedial plan-was too stringent.87 According to Judge
Wisdom, an employer often decides to institute an affirmative ac-
tion plan because a realistic appraisal of his work force indicates
possible liability to discrimination suits instituted by minorities or
the government.'" If the effort to avoid that liability opens the way
to reverse discriminaton charges, the employer is placed in a di-
lemma.'. Judge Wisdom, therefore, would require only that the
voluntary affirmative action plan be "a reasonable remedy for an
arguable violation of Title VII."18 n Creation of this "zone of reasona-
bleness," Judge Wisdom asserted, would encourage private volun-
tary action whereas the majority holding would discourage it."'
The plan at issue in Weber fell within Judge Wisdom's zone of
reasonableness. The dissent pointed out that Kaiser's past discrimi-
nation had not been litigated because no party to the suit had rea-
son to raise the issue.9 2 Judge Wisdom examined three possible
Title VII violations that might have supported a finding of prior
discrimination: possible discrimination against blacks applying for
unskilled jobs,'9 3 a pre-1974 violation in the craft-experience require-
ment for entry into the training program,' and an arguable viola-
tion in requiring any training for certain craft jobs.' Thus Kaiser
had acted reasonably in adopting a plan to forestall possible liabil-
ity for Title VII violations."' After evaluating the potential risk of a
discrimination suit, Judge Wisdom analyzed the reasonableness of
the remedy adopted, listing four factors that established the plan
as a reasonable response: its similarity to quotas approved by the
courts,' 7 the union's status as a representative of all employees in
186. 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975).
187. 563 F.2d at 229-30.
188. Id. at 230-31.
189. Id. at 231.
190. Id. at 230.
191. Id. Judge Wisdom noted that:
The majority's standard will lead to less voluntary compliance with Title VII. Em-
ployers and unions would be liable unless they instituted exactly what a reviewing court
felt should have been instituted. They could either bring declaratory judgment actions,
or wait to be sued. Under either alternative, our dockets would be filled with more Title
VII suits, the Congressional emphasis on voluntary conciliation would be frustrated, and
the elimination of the blight of racial discrimination would be still further blighted.
Id.
192. Id. at 231.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 231-32.
195. Id. at 232.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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negotiating the plan,"' the minimal impact on white workers be-
cause the plan created entirely new rights or expectations,' and the
guarantee of significant participation by whites because they were
guaranteed half of the places in the training program. "
Judge Wisdom also rejected the majority's position on societal
discrimination and found the plan at issue "a proper response to
societal discrimination against blacks." 20' For Wisdom, an em-
ployer's effort to compensate an employee for societal discrimina-
tion does not violate Title VII, which does not prohibit "restorative
justice." 202 When a history of discrimination against minorities ex-
ists, such as that found in the craft trades, Judge Wisdom would
approve the use of racial preference to eradicate societal discrimina-
tion.203
Wisdom's final disagreement with the majority centered on the
validity of Executive Order 11,246.204 He rejected the majority's con-
clusion that Title VII conflicted with the affirmative action require-
ment of the executive order.205 Affirmative action plans instituted
under the executive order have survived legal challenges in a series
of cases, and Congress itself, in the course of amending Title VII in
1972, gave tacit approval to the affirmative action mandate of Exec-
utive Order 11,246.206 Thus Judge Wisdom would permit voluntary
affirmative action programs using quotas in employment and would
reject the reverse discrimination rationale that underlay the major-
ity opinion in Weber.
VI. CONCLUSION: EMPLOYER AFFIRMATIVE AcrION
A. Strict Scrutiny Analysis in the Employment Context
Bakke defined certain aspects of permissible voluntary affirma-
tive action in educational admissions: a school may consider race
as a factor in admissions, but absent a finding that a university has
engaged in past discrimination, a quota system is unlawful. Appli-
cation of Bakke, a case decided under Title VI, to the affirmative
action/reverse discrimination issue in the employment context re-
198. Id. at 232-33.
199. Id. at 233-34.
200. Id. at 234.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 235.
203. Id. at 235-36.
204. Id. at 236-37.
205. Id. at 237.
206. Id. at 237-38. Judge Wisdom cited the congressional rejection of proposed amend-
ments that would have prohibited the use of quotas and goals under Executive Order 11,246
and concluded that Congress had ratified plans like the Philadelphia Plan. See Part II(C)
supra.
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quires careful examination. The Justices who would have affirmed
in its entirety the California Supreme Court ruling in Bakke looked
solely at the Title VI prohibition of discrimination based on race
and held the program unlawful because it excluded some applicants
on racial grounds. Those Justices conceivably might interpret and
apply Title VII in the same manner in an employment reverse dis-
criminaton context and conclude that because the statute forbids
discrimination on grounds of race, a voluntary affirmative action
plan using quotas is unlawful racial discrimination. Similarly, the
four Justices who approved of the university's affirmative action
program might follow the same reasoning in an employment suit
and allow voluntary race-conscious measures to remedy underrepre-
sentation of minorities in the work force. Thus, in the employment
context as well as in Bakke, the decisive question is whether the
position enunciated by Justice Powell applies to Title VII. In equat-
ing Title VI and the equal protection clause, Justice Powell adopted
the constitutional strict scrutiny standard as the statutory standard
for a Title VI violation. Because Title VI and Title VII are parts of
a single legislative package and because both contain language pro-
hibiting discrimination based on race, it can be argued that affirma-
tive action/reverse discrimination suits brought under Title VII are
subject to the same analysis as such suits brought under Title VI.
If Justice Powell enunciated the Court's approach not just to Title
VI but to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a whole, then strict scrutiny
has become the standard for Title VII as well.
Application of a strict scrutiny standard would require that
proponents of an affirmative action program in employment demon-
strate that the program fulfills a compelling interest. In Bakke Jus-
tice Powell found a compelling state interest in the protection of
academic freedom and the promotion of diversity among the stu-
dent body.27 This finding enabled Justice Powell to rule that consid-
eration of race as a factor in admissions was neither unlawful nor
unconstitutional. The program at issue, however, was invalid be-
cause, in Justice Powell's opinion, it was not the least restrictive
means of achieving a diverse student body.
Assuming that strict scrutiny is the proper test, the question
arises whether any comparable interest in the employment context
would meet the constitutional standard. Clearly, there is no special
argument for diversity within a work force as there is for diversity
within a student body. The national policy in favor of allowing the
free collective bargaining process to determine labor-management
relationships, however, may provide the compelling interest compa-
207. 98 S.Ct. at 2760-61.
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rable to academic freedom needed to meet the strict scrutiny stan-
dard. The Supreme Court has recognized and approved the princi-
ple of industrial self-determination established by Congress in the
National Labor Relations Act.2"' Restrictions on voluntary affirma-
tive action programs would interfere with that self-determination.
The affirmative action plan in Weber established a special sen-
iority system solely for selections to an on-the-job training pro-
gram.2 01 Past decisions of the Supreme Court explicitly approved
modification of seniority systems either by statute or collective bar-
gaining agreement in order to further strong public policy interests.
In approving "constructive" seniority in Franks v. Bowman Trans-
portation Co., the Court noted that it had previously upheld a con-
gressional award of retroactive seniority to employees returning to
their former jobs after military service despite its effect on the sen-
iority expectations of other workers. 2 10 Moreover, the Franks Court
noted that a collective bargaining agreement could go beyond what
the statute required in "enhancing the seniority status of certain
employees for purposes of furthering public policy interests" despite
the detrimental effect of the enhanced seniority on other workers'
expectations based on a previous seniority plan.211 The Franks Court
concluded that an employer and union could modify a seniority
system in order to further the national policy of ameliorating the
effects of discrimination. 2 12
Having recognized a compelling interest in industrial self-
determination, traditional strict scrutiny would then examine
whether a quota was the least restrictive means by which an em-
ployer and union could attain a racially balanced workforce. In
208. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 779 (1976); Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50, 61-70 (1975); Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
209. 563 F.2d at 218 n.1.
210. 424 U.S. at 778. The Court cited Tilton v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 376 U.S. 169 (1964),
and Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
211. 424 U.S. at 778. The Court cited Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953),
in which it had approved a provision of a collective bargaining agreement giving constructive
seniority including time in the military to new employees as well as to former employees
returning to their jobs.
212. 424 U.S. at 779. The Court cited Pellicer v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 217
F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 912 (1955), in which the Fifth Circuit bad
approved a collective bargaining agreement modification of seniority that integrated black
employees and white employees and consequently diminished the seniority expectations of
white employees. The Pellicer court stated:
The law is that changes effectuating differentiations or unequal treatment among em-
ployees are not invalid unless some clearly expressed public policy is contravened; and
that in the absence of fraud or bad faith the courts will not inquire into the motives
which prompt such changes, nor will they substitute their judgment for that of the
bargaining agency on the reasonableness of the modifications.
Id. at 206.
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Bakke Justice Powell found the university's special admissions plan
to be a quota system and therefore deemed it overly restrictive. He
offered as an example of a permissible approach the Harvard admis-
sions program, in which race is only one factor among many consid-
ered.213 Justice Brennan, however, remained unconvinced by the
distinction between admitting a specific number of qualified minor-
ity applicants and using race as a plus factor in admissions. He
concluded that "[flor purposes of constitutional adjudication,
there is no difference between the two approaches."' At most, the
distinction is between a firm quota and a flexible quota. In contrast
to the University of California's reserving sixteen places for disad-
vantaged applicants, the Harvard plan deliberately avoids "target-
quotas." 2 15 Yet the very existence of the plan presupposes a con-
scious, if unspoken, decision that a certain proportion of the student
body will be qualified minority applicants. The result in either case
is that some qualified individuals within a larger group of applicants
receive a preference based on race.
Although the use of a flexible quota may be feasible in educa-
tional admissions, the Harvard approach is impracticable for an
employer. He cannot give the time to evaluating each applicant that
a university admissions committee gives. Nor are the multiple fac-
tors that an admissions committee considers relevant to employ-
ment .2 The primary concern is whether an employee is qualified to
do the job. Among applicants having the basic ability to perform the
work or to learn the job, race may be the single distinguishing factor.
At that point, the use of a percentage or a one-to-one ratio until a
balanced workforce is attained is appropriate, and a firm quota is
the least restrictive alternative.
213. 98 S.Ct. at 2762-63. Justice Powell described the Harvard program thus:
In such an admissions program, race or ethnic background may be deemed a "plus"
in a particular applicant's file, yet it does not insulate the individual from comparison
with all other candidates for the available seats. . . . In short, an admissions program
operated in this way is flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in
light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same
footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight.
Indeed, the weight attributed to a particular quality may vary from year to year depend-
ing upon the "mix" both of the student body and the applicants for the incoming class.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
214. Id. at 2793.
215. Id. at 2762. The Harvard plan states that "10 or 20 black students" would not be
enough to achieve diversity in the student body. By this statement, the plan implicitly
acknowledges that it aims at some larger number. Id. at 2765-66.
216. The Harvard program considers such varied factors as regional background, musi-
cal talent, artistic talent, athletic ability, scientific aptitude, as well as race and ethnic origin,
in choosing a diverse student body. Id. at 2765.
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B. The Statutory Standard for Private Action Under Title VII
Although the equal protection strict scrutiny test can be satis-
fied, it is inappropriate in the Title VII context. The object of strict
scrutiny is to find a compelling state interest that justifies the chal-
lenged classification, yet affirmative action in employment results
from the decisions of a private individual or entity, the employer.
Under the facts of Bakke, the Title VI and equal protection issues
were closely related because the institution accused of discrimina-
tion was a state school.2 17 The requisite state action to trigger the
constitutional standard of strict scrutiny was present. Weber, on the
other hand, presents action by a private employer and a union. A
standard premised on state action and requiring demonstration of
a compelling state interest is inapposite when the challenged action
is undertaken voluntarily by private entities.218
Significantly, the Supreme Court itself ruled in Washington v.
Davis2 19 that the standards for an equal protection violation and for
a Title VII violation were not the same: plaintiffs seeking to prove
a constitutional violation must prove an intent to discriminate, but
a showing of disparate impact is sufficient to establish a statutory
violation. Thus the Court has distinguished between applicable
standards for Title VII and the equal protection clause and held that
the two should not be equated.
Because the Bakke strict scrutiny approach should not apply
to Title VII, the Court must adopt a new standard for determining
whether a voluntary affirmative action program is permissible.
Judge Wisdom's dissent in Weber suggested a zone of reasonable-
ness test, under which an employer's affirmative action plan is per-
217. Id. at 2756.
218. Although some might argue on the basis of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948),
and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), that the effort to comply with
Executive Order 11,246 introduces a sufficient element of government involvement to support
a state action theory, more recent Supreme Court rulings have indicated that governmental
approval or regulation does not convert action by a private entity into state action. In Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), for example, the Court held that regulation by a
state liquor control board did not transform the discriminatory guest policies of Moose Lodge
into state action violating the fourteenth amendment. Although the liquor control board
licensed the club, the club itself developed its own policy of excluding blacks. More recently,
in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), the Court found that governmen-
tal authorization or approval of privately initiated action did not convert that action into
state action. Executive Order 11,246 might be challenged as state action violating the four-
teenth amendment; the lower courts, however, have rejected equal protection challenges to
the executive order and quota plans instituted under it. See Part H1 supra. Furthermore, a
constitutional challenge to the executive order would be a separate issue from the purely
statutory question of the private employer's decision to use a racial preference to increase
minority employees.
219. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Court distinguished the constitutional standard from the
Title VII standard it had applied in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 429 (1971).
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missible if it is a reasonable response to existing circumstances and
reasonable in its formation and effects.220 It is reasonable for the
Court to allow an employer to rely on EEOC guidelines in determin-
ing whether to institute an affirmative action plan. Title VII pro-
vides that reliance on and compliance with "any written interpreta-
tion or opinion" issued by the EEOC is a defense against a discrimi-
nation suit.221 Thus EEOC guidelines and regulations have a tacit
authorization by Congress and are the logical source of affirmative
action models.
The EEOC's most recent guidelines, explicitly designed to en-
courage voluntary action, place an obligation upon an employer to
comply with nondiscrimination requirements without waiting for
action by a government agency. 222 The guidelines declare that a
finding of specific prior discrimination by the employer is not re-
quired for a voluntary affirmative action program and that the use
of race-conscious goals is permissible whether to remedy past dis-
crimination or to insure that present practices are nondiscrimi-
natory. The EEOC guidelines go beyond what the Supreme Court
has recognized as valid affirmative action in that they do not require
a finding or an admission of prior discrimination by the entity estab-
lishing the program. However, as the Supreme Court noted in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., "[t]he administrative interpretation of
the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference." 2 At
issue in Griggs was the interpretation of section 703(h) of Title VII,
which permitted employers to use professionally developed ability
tests. EEOC guidelines interpreted section 703(h) as allowing only
job-related tests, and the Court treated those guidelines "as ex-
pressing the will of Congress."2 24 Subsequently, in Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody,22 the Court looked not only to the general principle
stated in the guidelines but also to their detailed criteria for valida-
ting a test as job-related.
Powell's opinion in Bakke offers further support for deferring to
administrative guidelines enunciated pursuant to Title VII. Justice
Powell pointed out that the Bakke decision did not "call into ques-
tion congressionally authorized administrative actions, such as con-
sent decrees under Title VII . . . ."226 He also distinguished situa-
220. 563 F.2d at 230 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1976).
222. 29 C.F.R. § 1608 (1978).
223. 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). See also McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273, 279 (1976) (EEOC's "interpretations are entitled to great deference"). But see
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-45 (1976).
224. 401 U.S. at 434.
225. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
226. 98 S.Ct. at 2755 n.41.
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tions in which "there has been detailed legislative consideration of
the various indicia of previous constitutional or statutory violations,
. . . and particular administrative bodies have been charged with
monitoring various activities in order to detect such violations and
formulate appropriate remedies." 27 Congressional consideration of
national employment discrimination in passing Title VII supplies
the detailed legislative consideration to which Justice Powell refers,
and the EEOC has been charged with monitoring employment dis-
crimination and formulating remedies. 22 The congressional stress
on conciliation and informal solutions shaped by the EEOC and the
employer further supports the concept of permissible voluntary ac-
tion to increase minority employees. 229 In addition, Justice Powell
explicitly distinguished employment discrimination cases from the
Title VI suit and noted that the courts had upheld racial preferences
if a legislative or administrative body had determined that the
"industries affected" had discriminated in the past. This phrasing
suggests that proof of specific discrimination by an individual em-
ployer is not necessary when broader discrimination in a relevant
area is established. Although in Weber the Fifth Circuit confined its
decision to a single program in a single plant,2' the facts indicate
that the entire aluminum industry was under governmental pres-
sure to increase minority employment.232 Furthermore, the union
that was party to the collective bargaining agreement had excluded
blacks unlawfully in the past and was party to consent decree af-
firmative action plans in other industries.23 Thus under Justice
Powell's interpretation of employment case law, the use of racial
preferences in Weber was justified.
When an employer's circumstances justify the use of racial
preferences, the use of quotas is a reasonable response if properly
implemented. The EEOC guidelines, the policy statement of the
Equal Opportunity Coordinating Council,"4 and regulations issued
pursuant to Executive Order 11,246 all describe a three-step proce-
dure for developing a voluntary affirmative action plan: (1) analysis
of the workforce to learn whether women and minority groups are
underutilized in proportion to their presence in the relevant job
227. Id.
228. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
229. See text accompanying notes 40-45 supra.
230. 98 S.Ct. at 2754.
231. 563 F.2d at 225-26 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 229.
233. Id.
234. Policy Statement on Affirmative Action Programs for State and Local
Governments, 41 Fed. Reg. 38,814 (1976), reprinted in Appendix to Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedure, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,290 (1978).
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market; (2) initiation of steps to remedy disparities revealed by this
analysis, including race-conscious procedures, goals, recruitment,
reorganization of work, revamping of selection instruments, and the
like; and (3) establishment of the overall goal of genuine equal em-
ployment opportunity based on ability.23 5
The underutilization study provides the type of statistics recog-
nized as establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. The lead-
ing case in the employment context is Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,238
in which the Supreme Court ruled that plaintiff had established a
prima facie case by showing that an employment practice neutral
on its face had a disparate impact on black applicants. More re-
cently, the Court recognized in Hazelwood School District v. United
Statesm7 that a significant deviation between the proportion of mi-
nority employees and the proportion of qualified minority workers
in the relevant labor pool showed discrimination. As the Court
noted in Castaneda v. Partida,23 8 a suit alleging discriminatory
grand jury selection, and in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Development Corp.,239 a housing discrimination
suit, a significant discrepancy between numbers of minorities ac-
tually present and the numbers that statistically should be present
if selection were random suggests discrimination. Thus the statistics
provided by an underutilization study are the kind of facts on which
a court would base a finding of discrimination; consequently, such
a study would enable an employer to assess his potential liability
for discrimination. It could substitute, therefore, for a judicial find-
ing of discrimination. The underutilization study also offers a safe-
guard against needless creation of an affirmative action plan. Only
when statistical findings show a significant disparity would an em-
ployer and union be justified in setting up a voluntary plan. More-
over, when an employer finds an existing disparity, the only effec-
tive method of avoiding potential liability is the establishment of
quotas to equalize the racial composition of his work force with that
of the surrounding labor market.
A further justification for a Weber-type affirmative action plan
is that the employer and union modeled their plan after one estab-
lished by consent decree in the steel industry and approved by the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries.240
An employer acts reasonably when he looks to a consent decree in a
235. 41 C.F.R. H§ 60-1.40, 60-2.10 to 2.14 (1978).
236. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
237. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
238. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
239. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
240. 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975).
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similar industry in order to develop his own plan. Furthermore,
because a consent decree requires no finding or admission of prior
discrimination, an employer utilizing the decree as a model should
not become liable to a reverse discrimination suit simply because
he has not been found guilty of prior discrimination.
Additional factors indicating the reasonableness of a voluntary
plan include its actual effects and the relationship between employ-
ment qualifications and the nature of the work to be performed. The
plan in Weber created a new training program: it neither deprived
white employees of an existing right to an existing training program
nor affected the general seniority rights and benefits of employees. 241
Furthermore, all applicants to the program met a basic level of
qualification; the blacks admitted were not unqualified individuals
displacing qualified whites.4 2
An additional element of reasonableness is present when the
affirmative action plan has been established as part of a collective
bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court in Franks v. Bowman
Transportation Co. recognized the right of employer and union to
modify seniority standings through a collective bargaining agree-
ment. When employer and union negotiate an affirmative action
plan in the collective bargaining agreement, the employees them-
selves are represented in the bargaining process by their union,
which has a duty of fair representation to all members. 243 The agree-
ment negotiated by the union may displease some members, but
their individual displeasure does not outweigh the need for the bar-
gaining strength that results from the principle of exclusive repre-
sentation. Furthermore, courts and the legislature have created ade-
quate safeguards for the interests of dissenting members. 244
The Supreme Court in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Ad-
dition Community Organization245 applied the principle of exclusive
representation to employment discrimination as well as to general
labor-management relations. Reasoning that the union's position as
exclusive representative of its members was essential to collective
bargaining and that the courts and Congress had established ade-
quate safeguards against majority tyranny over minority interests
within the union,248 the Court held that minority employees' racial
241. 563 F.2d at 233-34.
242. Id.
243. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330 (1953); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
244. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization,
420 U.S. 50 (1975). The relevant analogy is the representative or senator elected to serve a
term in Congress; his decisions and the results of his voting rarely please all of his constitu-
ents, but he represents the voters of his district during his term of office.
245. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
246. Id. at 61-65.
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discrimination complaints should have been processed through the
grievance arbitration method provided in the collective bargaining
agreement. 247 The existence of racial discrimination did not justify
minority employees in bypassihg grievance arbitration and picket-
ing in violation of a no-strike clause in the contract.248 Thus the
union represents employee interests in matters of discrimination as
well as in matters of wages, hours, and benefits.
If a voluntary affirmative action plan using quotas is based
upon valid statistics showing underutilization of minorities, the
Court should recognize the competence of the employer to institute
that plan. The examination should then focus on whether the plan
itself is a reasonable response to facts indicating potential liability
and whether it has reasonable effects both in alleviating underrepre-
sentation and on nonminority workers.
The affirmative action/reverse discriminaton issue poses a
painful and serious dilemma to which there are no simple answers.
It is not possible to achieve absolute racial neutrality in employ-
ment situations. Past societal discrimination still affects decisions
made in hiring and promotion, and minorities remain at a disadvan-
tage. Although words like "quotas" and "numerical goals" may be
a frightening reduction of individuals to numbers, quotas remain at
present the single objective validation of an employer's attempt to
give minorities an equal chance at jobs, promotions, and other em-
ployment advantages. The Court, therefore, should not bar volun-
tary efforts to increase the numbers and improve the status of mi-
nority workers, nor should it exclude quotas as tools of voluntary
affirmative action.
JUDTrH MILLER JANSSEN
247. Id. at 65-70.
248. Id. at 70.
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